How the Symposium Opened my Eyes

4/3/2026

I was able to record the symposium and listen last weekend. It opened my eyes to understanding that what is happening in Latin America is driven not just by Latin American countries’ own domestic issues, or by U.S. influence, but by global influences. In the symposium, the global influence discussed was that of China. The idea that there are global influences over Latin America should not have been new to me. As I discussed earlier in my blog, the book, Why Nations Fail, emphasized the role of Spanish colonialism over much of Latin America. I had just never considered the role ofChina, although listening to the symposium, I clearly should have.

The points below were shared, in some way or another by the various speakers and panelists, including “Tino” (Mariano Florentino) (President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Mark Wu (Director of the Fairbanks Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard), Pedro Henrique Batista Barbosa (an expert in Brazil-China political- economic relations), Rebecca Bill Chavez (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs in the U.S. Department of Defense during the Obama- Biden administration) and Enrique Dussel Peters (Graduate School of Economics, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)

My first few take-aways from the symposium, in bullet format, are these:

• China’s impact in Latin America is not just beginning to grow; it has already grown. Many Latin American countries are already deeply tied economically to China.

• Latin American countries need to hedge their bets, and they need to maintain relationships globally with more than just the United States, if only to keep their own economies going and avoid becoming a puppet of the U.S.

• The BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), a large-scale strategy implemented by China about a decade ago that connects Asian, African and European land and maritime networks to stimulate trade, is expanding in Latin America as well. If the U.S. wants Latin America to disentangle from this, it may not be able to make an economic case. It may need to make the case based on security concerns. But  while security concerns are paramount for the Caribbean and Mexico, this is less so for South America. Still, if security concerns are paramount for Mexico, it will be easier for the U.S. to have an influence on Mexico than say, Argentina, if it can cite security concerns.

• Mexico offers an example of how it is hard to disentangle economically. One speaker at the symposium claimed 30% of Mexican imports are from China. If  the U.S. does not want China in its backyard, it has started way too late, because Mexico needs these goods. If the U.S. does not want Mexico doing business with China, a question arises as to where would Mexico look for replacement goods. If the U.S. technological goods are not as effective as those from China, there will (and should) be resistance in Mexico to these changes. And, ironically, the main importers of goods in Mexico from China are actually U.S. based companies. 

  • • The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement, has not benefitted Mexico like it has benefitted the U.S. The think tanks in Washington that report on the problem are not properly educating U.S. Congressional and Senate leaders on the issues, so the people who can help improve it do not know enough about how to improve it. The level of discussion in the Senate about Latin America generally, and this in particular, lacks insight and any depth of analysis. As a result, if the U.S. thinks that Mexico “should not” look globally to China, it needs to think more strategically. Still, Brazil won’t change its approach to the world based on U.S. pressure. Brazil’s history has shown that it is most concerned with its own national interests and keeping “strategic autonomy.” Brazil tends to reject external interference with its domestic affairs. Brazil is an “economic pragmatist.” Brazil would be willing to side more with the U.S. and do less business with China, but mainly, Brazil should only be willing to do that if the economic benefit it obtains through its relationship with China can be replaced somewhere else. Brazil needs to be able to sell its good somewhere for its own economy to function well.

• Brazil offers a second example. As one speaker said, Brazil won’t change its approach to the world based on U.S. pressure. Brazil’s history has shown that it is most concerned with its own national interests and keeping “strategic autonomy.” Brazil tends to reject external interference with its domestic affairs. Brazil is an “economic pragmatist.” Brazil would be willing to side more with the U.S. and do less business with China, but mainly, Brazil should only be willing to do that if the economic benefit it obtains through its relationship with China can be replaced somewhere else. Brazil needs to be able to sell its good somewhere for its own economy to function well.

• China is in Latin America because it needs Latin America: it needs to grow its economy for its own people and simply to compete against the U.S. In fact, as much as China has emerged as the only global rival to the U.S. economically, it is not truly that. China’s per capita income is just over Argentina’s and still below Brazil’s.

• China may be better off overall than countries in Latin America but not much so. China has millions of people living on less than $3000 per year, and its numbers are comparable to Brazil and Mexico combined.

• The U.S. may be competing with China in Latin America, but the U.S. cannot completely shut out China, as the U.S. itself is economically dependent on China. The U.S. itself cannot de-couple from China.

• BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) is not what the U.S. fears. It is not “one voice” but a group of countries with similar characteristics. It is simply a platform for countries with a similar economic interest and status to meet, discuss, engage, but also have more of a voice in international affairs (even if not a unified voice). Some say BRICS is “dead” but others say, “not at all.” It is simply a group of developing economies coming together to discuss, recognize opportunities, and align peacefully.

• BRICS is also not “Anti-Western” as some argue. Still, the New Development Bank (formerly known as the BRICS Development Bank) is based in Shanghai, and it aims to fund infrastructure and development projects across these nations, offering a supposed faster and easier alternative to U.S. funding. Its aim is to create market alternatives and increase trade. But if the U.S. is arguing that BRICS is a security threat, it is wrong. It is not some kind of global “block” or “unit” and, in fact, the countries in it are also so different in so many ways that it’s not even possible to reach consensus within it.

More from the symposium coming soon.